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Monarchy and German identity in the later
'Germany' was where the German tongue was heard. To medievalists, and perhaps especially to those with their roots in the Anglophone and Francophone traditions, the idea should be a familiar one. 'It is probably best to begin with language in the search for German identity', a standard English-language survey of late medieval Germany recommends.
2 Surprisingly familiar, we ought surely to say, because the European political landscape of Arndt's day was obviously very different from that of the late Middle Ages. For Arndt, writing in 1813, and for the lecture-hall and drawing-room patriots who shared his ideals, a German state capable of framing their putative nation was a dream and an aspiration. 3 The German nation to which they felt attachment remained what Friedrich Meinecke would later call a Kulturnation: one which drew such unity as it had from shared cultural values, not from political institutions and the effects of power. 4 In the Middle Ages, by contrast, most speakers of the German language -regardless of whether or not they can be said to have inhabited a common 'state' 5 -did at least recognise a shared political allegiance: to the ruler of the Holy Roman Empire. 6 Yet in spite of this, an explicitly political conception of Germanness seems to have eluded them. The imperial bond, it appears, did not exercise for the Empire's German subjects the same kind of compulsive force that, by the later Middle Ages, loyalties to king and kingdom were beginning to acquire in other western European realms. 7 Consequently, in an era which saw popular sentiments and loyalties elsewhere in Europe solidifying within the structures of the nascent monarchical state, 'German' identity had to draw such small sustenance as it could from cultural -specifically, linguistic -points of reference. That, at least, is the prevailing impression. Bernard Guenée expresses the distinction starkly:
In the birth of French national identity … a political fact -the existence of a king and a kingdom -was of primordial importance. In the later Middle Ages there were trends towards a more articulate selfconsciousness of nationhood. This might be based on language; Germans, … despite their lack of political integration, expressed sentiments of nationhood.
9
The 'cultural nation' available to late medieval Germans was clearly a second-best outcome: a consolation prize for a people which had 'failed' to 'achieve' a mature and comprehensive framework of monarchical institutions -a project in which their French neighbours, by contrast, are to be congratulated on their 'remarkable success'. 10 The inability of the Germans to fashion their medieval nation within clear structures of power was no petty omission, however, but was in the longer term to prove portentous, for themselves and for the rest of Europe -as Adrian Hastings recently argued, in an important comparative essay:
The German predicament -consciousness of nationhood, absence of a state, strength of German as a literary language -made the particular form which German nationalism would take almost inevitable, the nationalism of ius sanguinis, the most dangerous of all nationalism's forms. A combination of high prestige and ineffectiveness in the medieval Empire held the German political nation in thrall, leaving the task of national identification to language and literature. The essay draws inspiration, and a further justification, from the compelling general account of the relationship between medieval kingdoms and collective identities offered by Susan Reynolds. 13 For Reynolds, medieval 'national' communities were imagined within a mould formed by kingdoms. Accounts of shared descent and of common pasts were, according to this view, powerful fictions shaped around the hard facts of political allegiance;
and so close was the fit between them that Reynolds was able to urge substituting the adjective 'regnal' for the potentially problematical 'national'. 14 It is a vision of medieval political solidarities that leaves no space for the formation of Kulturnationen: Reynolds's 'regnal' communities were at their heart political ones. Her approach seems, therefore, to render highly problematical the account of late medieval German identity with which we have become familiar. A major aim of this paper is, therefore, to trace the connections and disjunctures which the sources reveal, between notions of Germanness and the rulers, institutions, and narratives of imperial power to which late medieval Germans were made 12 For a detailed account of German political history in the period, concentrating on the imperial monarchy, Europe principal motors and objects of 'national' allegiances, were in Germany relatively enfeebled. Essentially, the problem was twofold: the Empire's ruler exercised in Germany a rule too meagre, too qualified and too opaque to have been capable of crystallising any sense of Germanness among the Empire's subjects; and, in any case, the doctrinal and constitutional systems upon which the imperial monarchy historically rested were such as to render inadmissible any notion of a distinct, limited sphere of rule over a specific, self-conscious 'regnal' community. Whether viewed as a series of institutions and instruments of power or as a body of principles, the imperial monarchy, set beside its rapidly evolving counterparts in the west, appears hopelessly moribund and archaic.
35
The conditions for the growth in Germany of strong royal government had never been government to the established men of power in the regions. 36 Imperial, and in the later years also dynastic, commitments in the south kept the rulers of the central Middle Ages out of Germany for long periods: of the final thirty years of his reign, Frederick II spent just twenty months north of the Alps. 37 Imperial government in Germany showed few signs of the early bureaucratisation detectable in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in other, smaller and more compact, European realms. 38 During the thirteenth century, the threadbare fabric of the Empire's institutions was rent, their functioning shaken, by a series of grave material and ideological shocks, and by constitutional changes with far-reaching importance. After 1198, and again in the middle decades of the thirteenth century, the crown became the object of violent competition, in the course of which substantial imperial resources passed into the hands of powerful individuals and communities. 39 Bitter and protracted conflict with the papacy hastened the process of material disintegration, but also cast a shadow over the monarchy's traditional prestige. It seemed to some that the medieval Roman Empire's days were numbered. 40 The hereditary descent of the crown -well founded in practice, if not in principle, during the central Middle Ages -was radically ended, with the emergence, soon after mid-century, of a select group of princes exercising the right to nominate the Empire's ruler. 41 Between Frederick II's death in 1250 and that of his Habsburg namesake in 1493, son would only once follow father on the throne: in 1378, when Wenceslas succeeded the Luxemburger Charles IV. 42 Weakness and discontinuity are among the main themes in the history of the imperial monarchy during the later Middle Ages. The rule exercised by kings and emperors over the Empire's German territories was patchy, variable and intermittent. Few durable institutions were established, capable of discharging routine government functions in the ruler's absence. 43 His itinerary remained, as it had been in the early Middle Ages, the central instrument and expression of his power. Of surviving documents in the name of Rudolf of
Habsburg, only five per cent went to recipients living off the route of the king's travels. 44 The iter too was in the late Middle Ages a diminished institution, however, and those parts of Germany which Peter Moraw has termed königsfern -'remote' from the king's travels, and thus from his government -grew in size and inaccessibility. 45 The thirteenth and fourteenth centuries saw imperial rights and properties, which had traditionally sustained the itinerant monarch, fall in growing quantities into the hands of German princes and nobles. 46 During the same period, in an interconnected process, those princes built up the ramparts of sovereign government over their territories, shutting out the Empire's head. 47 63 In light of all this, it is easy to see why, at a time when royal government elsewhere in Europe was taking root in settled urban centres, nothing comparable is seen in the Reich. Prague, the city which for a while seems most to resemble an imperial capital, lay outside Germany, within a distinct kingdom, with its own political culture, traditions, and non-German majority tongue. 64 Few
German princes showed any desire to spend time there. 65 Within Germany, some of a capital's functions were displayed by the imperial city of Nuremberg, where late medieval kings and emperors made many visits. 66 Their presence there was, however, too irregular and too short-term for the town to develop as a major seat of government.
There was not even an accepted imperial mausoleum in Germany, to receive the bones of the Empire's rulers: Rudolf of Habsburg was interred alongside his Salian and Staufer forebears at Speyer, and the remains of his two immediate successors were subsequently placed there also; but the rulers who came after were scattered to diverse corners of the Empire, mostly finding burial in their family lands. 67 It would, it appears, be hard to conceive of rulers less well suited to touch the imaginations of their German subjects, and thus to fashion in their minds the kind of 'regnal' community envisaged by Reynolds. Suspended between a shrinking, impoverished iter and dynastic patrimonies often remote from the old heartlands of the Reich, the instruments of imperial government atrophied -or showed, at best, merely fitful and sluggish growth in an age when neighbouring realms were taking giant strides. The role of literate methods in ruling the Empire remained modest: the 10,000 documents which recent scholarship ascribes to the long and busy reign of Charles IV make a stark contrast with the 90,000 noted in the registers of Charles' contemporary, Pope Clement VI (1342-1352). 72 The institutions of justice in the hands of the Empire's ruler were meagre: the supreme court which sat in his name travelled with the imperial retinue, heard no criminal cases, had little power over the great men of the realm or their subjects, and entirely lacked local executive instruments.
73
The fiscal resources of the monarch were also limited. His power of taxation fell mainly on the burghers of the imperial towns, whose support, indispensable to his rule in Germany, could quickly be withdrawn were he to gain, as did Charles IV in his final years, a name for rapacity. 74 The growth of the importance of money in European society, a development which princes elsewhere were able to exploit to their benefit, left the Empire's rulers further weakened, in an age when German princes sold their support dear. 75 This in turn helped ensure that the great expansion in the scale of royal armies which is such a conspicuous element in the history of other European realms in the period had no counterpart in Germany.
The armed and warlike men in which, all commentators agreed, Germany was so fertile did not, on the whole, follow the banners of their monarch, but found other masters, with deeper 94 For this, see Vigener, Bezeichnungen (as n. 28); Schnell, 'Deutsche Literatur' (as n. 15), 258-75. which they were habitually deployed seemed to negate the very idea of a single, coherently 'German' sphere of existence. In most cases, writers in the vernacular adopted a plural form, referring not to 'Germany' but to the 'German lands'. 95 The defining essence of Germanness, this usage seems to declare, lay not in any notional 'regnal' unity under a monarch, but, on the contrary, in a daily-experienced reality of regional and local diversity and independence, in which monarchs and their acts had little or no part. Empire and its rulers seem to be so peripheral to German political life, and to have such modest substance in the German lands, commentators still paid them attention at all.
Whatever its material deficiencies, the imperial monarchy continued, at least among those literate Germans who left a record of their views, to act as a source of imagined unity and coherence. 115 Despite the fundamentally regional focus of much historical writing in late medieval Germany, the Empire and its rulers had a special capacity to motivate chroniclers to look beyond their habitual horizons, and take in more distant views. For many decades after the fall of the Hohenstaufen, extended historical works continued to be structured around, and devoted principally to recording, the events of imperial history. 116 On those occasions when northern chroniclers reported events in south Germany, these frequently concerned the deeds of the monarch. The Lübeck chronicler known as 'Detmar', for example, is among those who record the siege of Ulm by Charles IV in 1378. 117 By contrast, the almost complete invisibility of the north in south German chronicles doubtless has much to do with the monarch's own protracted absence from the northern regions. 118 The capacity of the Empire's ruler, regardless of his institutionalised power, his physical proximity, or even, on occasion, his legitimacy, to seize contemporary imaginations is revealed by the case of Tile Kolup, the impostor who appeared on the lower Rhine in 1284, claiming to be the emperor Frederick II.
Short and precarious as his 'reign' -first in Neuss, then in Wetzlar -proved to be, it was enough to earn him substantial notices in chronicles from parts as far distant as Austria, Styria and Alsace. 119 An explanation, on one level, lies in the triumph of hope over experience and coldeyed analysis. Chroniclers and other writers on the late medieval Empire consistently overrated the capacity of their rulers to cause, but also to cure, the ills of their society. Their way of thinking is illuminated by a negative example. A chronicler at the Bavarian monastery of Fürstenfeld is among a number of writers who paint in impossibly lurid shades the period of weak and divided rule which followed the downfall of the Hohenstaufen: not only were peace and justice absent, the chronicler alleges, but the land itself lay barren, until at last God ended the chastisement of his people (which had resembled that suffered by the Israelites) by sending a 'saviour', in the form of Rudolf of Habsburg. 120 German subjects of the Reich took literally the promises of peace and justice that Christian Roman emperorship seemed to extend to them. 121 Nevertheless, a view emphasising the monarch's power was not in every case unrealistic. If his scope to compel appears in the late Middle Ages distinctly small, his traditional power to sanction and to legitimise remained intact. Imperial privileges were still, in turbulent times, a valued source of protection -a fact which helps explain the prominent place accorded to the Empire's rulers in the mental world, and in the burgeoning historical writings, of German urban elites. 122 The difference that the monarch's intervention could on occasion still make was appreciated by the burghers of the imperial town of Donauwörth, who in the fifteenth century set up on their fortifications an image of King Sigismund, resplendent with crown and sceptre -a mark of gratitude for his part in helping them escape from the oppressive lordship of the dukes of Bavaria. 123 the clergy -could draw on an inherited historiography which had traditionally accorded the Empire a central place. 124 The succession of (ancient and medieval) Roman emperors, commencing with Augustus, became a well established framework for historical writing, readily adaptable to include regional perspectives and concerns. 125 At the same time, other media were making the imperial monarchy more generally accessible, for those with eyes to see. Particularly in towns, the period saw the setting up of significant works of public art which made reference to the Empire, to Christian rulership, and to particular rulers. 126 The gothic style, which gained acceptance in Germany in the thirteenth century, encouraged the multiplication of ambitious and realistic visual images. 127 These took various forms. Charles IV re-fashioned Prague as a complex stage set for the visual celebration of his imperial and Bohemian crowns. 128 Over seventy contemporary and near-contemporary likenesses of him are known to have existed -although only a portion of these were on public view. 129 Under
Charles and Wenceslas, the visitor to Prague could even see the imperial insignia on display, on the special feast day granted by the pope at Charles's urging. 130 But the ruler was also present -again, especially in towns -in rumour and popular report. These sometimes became substantial and dangerous enough to move the king to refute them. 131 A detailed eye-witness account of Charles IV's funeral in Prague, which found its way into a vernacular chronicle from distant Augsburg, appears to derive from a newsletter. 132 And where the monarch did show himself, the impact on those who were present should not be underrated. The public spectacle that attended Sigismund's reception in 1414 by the imperial town of Bern could stand for many. 133 Already in the suburbs, he was met by a company of 500 liveried boys of the town, garlanded with the arms of the Reich, and headed by a standard-bearer. At the town's gates, the clergy received him with banners and relics. The decorated streets through which he then passed were thronged by the entire population, Bern's councillors at their head.
No wonder, then, that German town chroniclers recount in such detail the visits made by kings and emperors. 134 The remoteness of the Empire and its high politics from the lives of ordinary Germans should not be overstated. In one particular way, it touched them with a ubiquity that had few parallels in late medieval Europe. Since the eleventh century, the quarrels of emperors and popes had delivered some heavy blows to the fabric of German society. 135 One of these lay in the harsh spiritual sanctions that were liable to fall on regions which remained loyal to recalcitrant emperors. These had the potential to affect everyone, regardless of status, age or sex. The disappearance of the Hohenstaufen dynasty did not end the wrangling of the 'two powers'. Relations remained tense, and open conflict with the Curia was resumed under
Ludwig the Bavarian. The long papal interdict which resulted caused distress and resentment, and focused German opinion on the principles at stake and on the actions and moral qualities of the protagonists. 136 Particularly in the towns, Ludwig worked deliberately and successfully to nurture a sympathetic climate of opinion. When, in 1338, procurators from Aachen appeared before Benedict XII at Avignon, the pope acknowledged that he had already received thirty-six identical letters from other imperial towns, professing loyalty to the emperor. 137 Imperial institutions may have had only a limited capacity to penetrate German society, but the arm of the Church had a surer and a more comprehensive reach. It was the instruments not of 'the state', but of its adversary, the spiritual power, that thus, for a time, took a part in reminding Germans of their subjection to a monarch.
***
Explaining the prominent place of the imperial monarchy in the imaginations at least of some late medieval Germans does not, however, on its own help us understand their readiness to ascribe to their rulers an ethnic frame of reference, and to view them as the leaders of a specifically German community of destiny, descent and political action. To account for that, two related matters must briefly be surveyed: the external character of the late medieval
Reich; and the constitutional and historical assumptions on which it rested. One explanation for the 'German' character ascribed to the imperial monarchy is straightforward: it was a conclusion that outward appearances seemed naturally to invite. The attention given by the Empire's rulers to their German territories may in the late Middle Ages have been slight and fitful; but, as a whole, Germany still saw far more of them than did any other region of the Reich. They were elected on German soil (mostly at Frankfurt) and crowned there (generally at Aachen), by a German prelate (properly, the archbishop of Cologne). 138 Other prominent ceremonies through which the new king took power. 139 142 The regular sources of imperial income on which the Empire's rulers relied, meagre and dwindling as they were, came from their German territories, as also did most of their servants and officials. 143 In some ways, the German character of the Reich came into sharper view between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries. If the voice of imperial government was not heard very distinctly by its German subjects, it did at least address them increasingly in their own tongue. Vernacular documents from the imperial chancery are first encountered around the middle of the thirteenth century. 144 During the fourteenth, the vernacular advanced rapidly, with German-language documents, close to half of the total surviving from Ludwig the Bavarian's chancery, becoming a clear majority by the time of Wenceslas. 145 The chronicler
John of Viktring, looking back from mid-century, was even moved to claim -mistakenly, but significantly -that Rudolf of Habsburg had decreed that German be adopted for royal diplomas, since Latin misled the laity. 146 During the same period, the passage of significant parts of imperial Burgundy under French control, coupled with a sharp fall in both the frequency and duration of the monarch's visits to Italy, helped ensure that the traditional distinction between the Empire as a whole and the narrower German regnum became harder to discern. 147 The habit in vernacular writings of using a single word -rîche -to signify both only hastened the process. 148 One element in the late medieval monarchy does, admittedly, seem to challenge the whole notion of a German 'regnal' community: the identity of the rulers themselves. The choice of king lay, in the first instance, with the prince-electors, and nothing bound them to choose a German. The candidates raised to the throne in the period thus included a king of
Castile and a brother of the king of England. 149 French princes were several times contenders, as were the English kings Edward III and Richard II. 150 In the thirteenth century, the crown had seemed destined to fall to the Přemyslid Otakar II of Bohemia. 151 It is hard even to ascribe a clear ethnicity to the princes of the house of Luxemburg, which supplied four of the the European high nobility, whose members did not seek their identity in narrow ethnic categories. 153 Associating the Luxemburgs with a specifically German sphere of power and culture is especially problematical. Henry VII seems barely to have understood the language. 154 Charles IV, Wenceslas and Sigismund all bore dynastic royal titles in addition to the imperial crown; the Hungarian kingdom held by Sigismund at the time of his election was not even within the Reich. Charles, in a break with tradition, incorporated the phrase rex Bohemie into his imperial title and paired the imperial eagle with the double-tailed Bohemian lion on his seals, conflating imperial and dynastic frames of reference. 155 The change was not lost on German observers: for a chronicler in fourteenth-century Magdeburg, the emperor was 'keiser Karle van Behmen'. 156 None of this, however, did much to undermine the idea of a German political community under its monarchs. In the first place, the fact that not all the Empire's rulers were German did not prevent at least some contemporaries from insisting that they ought to be, or, in the case of the Luxemburger, persuading themselves that they actually were. The publicist In a way, the ruler's own ethnicity was largely irrelevant in framing the identity of his German subjects. The German people as a whole, many writers agreed, had a special relationship with the imperial monarchy: it was their monarchy, granted to them, controlled by them, suited specially to their collective temperament and aptitudes, its prestige accruing to them alone. 161 Alexander of Roes wrote of 'the Germans, to whom the government of the world is translated'. 162 But who, in this sense, stood for 'the Germans'? For German commentators, the main conduit between the Empire and German identity was evidently not the monarch, but the German princes who elected him. 163 Novel though the electoral college may have been, it was viewed from the outset as the constitutional expression of ancient entitlements. 164 These were believed to have had an ethnic frame of reference from the outset.
The German princes, it was argued, were the bearers of the Roman Empire's historical 'translation' to the German people. 165 Evidence from the chronicles shows that the doctrine of translatio imperii in Germanos reached beyond rarefied learned circles, to a larger, more
German identity of the prince-electors -and, beyond them, to that of the larger community of princes and nobles loyal to the Reich. 167 The Schwabenspiegel, a legal compilation probably dating from the 1270s, was adamant, for example, that the temporal electors 'should be Germans (tvtsche man), all four'. 168 The readiness of narrative, and sometimes documentary, texts to insist on the 'Germanness' of the high nobility -even in formal contexts, where the monarch was given his full Roman titles -is a general pattern. 169 Ultimately, however, it was the ruler who, whatever the complexities of his own identity, supplied the most fundamental impulse to late medieval conceptions of the Germans.
The Reich was, after all, a monarchy, and it was the monarch who, by the bare fact of his existence, infused with meaning the powers of the electors and the duties of the German nobility. The princes appear in late medieval writings at their most 'German' when they are serving him: performing, under his leadership, the protective functions which, it was argued, had won their forebears the Christian Roman Empire in the first place. These duties were fundamentally military. 170 Their loyal discharge, at the emperor's summons, sanctioned the German people's continuing existence, through the imperial title, as a unique, and uniquely prestigious, political community. 171 Of course, by the fourteenth century, the ossification of imperial government and the growth of princely sovereignty had in hard fact gone far to consign such high-minded ideals to the realm of romantic fiction. That was not, however, how some literate Germans persisted in seeing things. Only thus can we explain the stubborn determination shown by otherwise well-informed fourteenth-century chroniclers, in a traditional, imperial style, to paint as sanguinary triumphs of German animositas the impoverished and disappointing forays of Henry VII and Ludwig the Bavarian in the south. 172 Others resigned themselves to disappointment, and to registering the gulf that seemingly yawned between the high duty to which the princes were called and the service they actually rendered. A Salzburg annalist professed himself unable to say whether King Rudolf's great victory over Otakar of Bohemia reflected glory or shame on 'our illustrious Germany' (nostra clara Germania), when it was observed how few princes had been with the king. 173 The routes traditionally taken by imperial armies had naturally led beyond the limits of Germany, to where Christendom's welfare or the Empire's wars dictated. In imagination, they led there still, even if the kings and emperors of the late Middle Ages rode them less often, and to less remarkable effect, than in days gone by. Italy retained for literate Germans its old power of suggestion. Yet the essential core, which nurtured the Empire's armies and gave them their defining qualities, the natural centre to which they would one day return, was
Germany. It was felix Germania that, in a frequent pun, 'germinated' the armed men whom the monarch led against neighbours and enemies. 174 'Germany' was habitually named when the ruler departed German soil at the head of an army, and named again when he returned -'over berch in Dudeschland', as Detmar wrote, in Lübeck, setting his gaze to the distant Alps. 175 It was to 'the German lands' that, in 1402, King Rupert explained, he had 'come back', from his dismal Italian adventure. 176 The same gravitational quality shows through in a letter from the city of Mainz. 177 Mainz's forces with Rupert's army had been given leave to 'ride back into the German lands'; and now that they were 'back home again', Mainz declared, the city was no longer willing to send men into Lombardy -to, as the letter phrases it, 'such a far-off land'. *** significance -when they knew of, or gave thought to, its existence at all. All that being said, when all its limitations are duly recorded, it remains to its core a political 'fatherland'. The
Germans were among the younger of western Europe's medieval 'nations'. 178 Their formative period was in the central Middle Ages, and the political allegiance around which the Teutonici coalesced in the minds of their literate spokespersons -the western, medieval
Roman Empire -was older than they. It was the Empire, and the acts of rulership which, in its high-medieval heyday, its monarchs undertook, that made the Germans -that is to say, made them manifest as a single, meaningful community, first to others, then to themselves.
The unwholesome, bookish, folkloric themes, whose deep-laid presence is occasionally suspected by modern long-range commentators on the course of German history, are, in fact, to an unusual degree missing. 179 Ancestor legends, descent and settlement myths, the celebration of blood, kin and ancient homeland -such elements are all found in the Middle
Ages more fully developed in other parts of Europe than in Germany. 180 The themes which stand out in German writings tend on the whole in an opposite direction. The late medieval
German 'nation' appears to a striking degree artificial, fabricated, composite: a result of the documented exercise of power by well attested historical actors in the comparatively recent past. Germanness, as literate medieval Germans themselves understood it, was a compromise -in some ways, a distinctly uneasy one. Perceiving in the political culture of late medieval
Germany patterns for the blood-and-soil ethnic fundamentalism of later and very different times requires, truly, the eye of faith.
There is, however, another, somewhat less melodramatic, viewpoint, which is often encountered in modern, comparative studies of medieval political allegiances. This regards the late medieval German 'nation', insofar as one existed at all, as inert and enfeebledsapped, by the meagreness of German political institutions, of the capacity for more than pale, cultural reference. As this paper has argued, this view too appears to show the distorting effect of assumptions derived from much later periods of German history. Here, however, some open-mindedness is advisable. First of all, it may be permissible to wonder whether the rich opportunities which medieval English and French royal government undeniably made available to their subjects, to pay their king's taxes, suffer the strictures of his justice, die in his wars, or help his officials with their interminable local inquiries, invariably nurtured in their breasts the patriotic fervour which some modern commentators suppose. The point would, at any rate, need to be proven, not merely assumed.
A weak yet prestigious monarchy on the German model -all promise and imperial pomp, with little pain -was perhaps not without its own appeal, and its own capacity to rally popular allegiance. 182 A survey of other regions of Latin Europe, from the Celtic west to the eastern marchlands, would yield plenty of stirring expressions of medieval patriotism, from the pens of writers in regions subject only to weak royal government, or to none at all. 183 All this suggests that the role of institutions in nurturing such sentiments may have been more complex than is sometimes supposed. In any case, the sceptic, confronted with the many 181 These two factors are particularly emphasised by Reynolds, Kingdoms and Communities (as n. 13), 253. 182 The seemingly paradoxical role of the, relatively weak, late medieval Scottish monarchy in nourishing patriotic sentiment is illustrated by Grant, 'Aspects of national consciousness' (as n. 32), esp. 79-81. 183 R.R. Davies, 'The peoples of Britain and Ireland 1100-1400: (i) identities', Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 6 th ser., 5 (1994), 1-20; Graus, Nationenbildung (as n. 33).
